Abstract Real-world simple plurality elections rarely bear out the strong Duvergerian prediction that, in equilibrium, only two competitors receive votes. Recent advances in strategic voting theory demonstrate that voter uncertainty about competitors' true support levels in the constituency may lead to limited strategic voting, and hence incomplete desertion of trailing parties. This is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact of uncertainty on incentives to vote strategically. Calibrating a model of strategic voting to voting results from simple plurality elections in German constituencies, it is found that strategic voters operate under high levels of uncertainty. These results support the proposition that uncertainty about party support impedes formation of Duvergerian equilibria.
Introduction
One of the most puzzling findings in the literature on strategic voting is that we often fail to observe two-party competition, despite abundant evidence for strategic voting in real-world plurality elections. This is puzzling because it is by now conventional wisdom that strategic voting should work to reduce the number of competitors in a simple plurality election to two. Specifically, when applied to single member constituencies, Duverger's law entails strategic coordination of supporters of weaker parties on the two front-runners (Cox 1997 This state of affairs is somewhat discomforting because what is considered by many as the distinctive virtue of the simple plurality election system, the pressure toward a twoparty system, critically rests on the assumption of potentially large scale strategic voting at the constituency level. If strategic voting fails to drive down the number of competitors significantly, then parties and candidates will not fear severe losses from entering or staying in the electoral race and multipartism will prevail. Given the alleged strengths of two-party systems in promoting government stability (Warwick 1994), accountability (Powell 2000) , and fiscal discipline (Persson et al. 2007; Austen-Smith 2000) , it is important to examine the reasons why voter coordination often fails to produce strict two-party competition.
This paper explores one reason for coordination failure that has drawn greater attention in the recent theoretical literature on strategic voting: the extent of voter uncertainty about the electoral outcome. To vote for a candidate that is not one's first preference obviously makes sense only if one can be sure that the preferred candidate is out of the running. Without common knowledge of who is trailing in the electoral race, voter coordination on two candidates is unlikely to succeed. Public opinion polls should, in theory, provide the information necessary for voters to coordinate, yet they are rarely if ever available at the level of constituencies. Uncertainty about party support may thus play a key role in impeding strategic coordination in real-world elections. This paper presents the first estimates of voter uncertainty from an empirical analysis of voting in simple plurality elections. The results suggest very high levels of uncertainty about the electoral outcome.
Extant game-theoretic treatments of strategic voting predict complete desertion of parties expected to come in third in a simple plurality election (Palfrey 1989; Myerson and Weber 1993; Cox 1994; Fey 1997) . In what is commonly termed a "Duvergerian equilibrium,' voting behavior gives rise to a steady state in which only two parties receive votes. An important assumption underlying the Duvergerian equilibrium argument is that the distribution of voter preferences is known by all voters. Thus, by the law of large numbers and although individual preferences are unknown, a voter may predict the outcome of the election with near certainty. Given that the outcome is common knowledge, voters then expect some supporters of the likely loser (the party in third place) to vote for the lesser of evils among the two viable contenders. Such expected desertion further damages the trailing party's prospects of winning, and hence causes more voters to desert that party. Positive feedback continues this way, ensuring a strict two-party outcome in equilibrium.
